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


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: Red Army Major General Nikolai A. Talensky, a noted writer on Soviet military doctrine, has condemned the idea that war might be justified if it meant the end of capitalism. In the magazine "International Life," Talensky said that after another war, which "could not fail" to be a world war, "the earth's population would be cut in half, and it would be the most active and most cultured part of mankind that would disappear." He concluded that a mass surprise attack cannot bring victory for the attacker because the retaliation could still destroy all his vital centers. OK

The article, which has been given added stature by a review by TASS, is a direct attack on the Chinese Communist attitude that the dangers of nuclear war have been overrated. Talensky is also in effect reiterating to the Chinese--who continue to clamor for Taiwan--that the concept of limited war is invalid because it would risk full-scale war. This is the most emphatic major article on military theory to appear in the Soviet press since the Sino-Soviet dispute sharpened at the Bucharest Conference and indicates an effort to show in practical military terms why the coexistence line must be followed.

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Sino-Soviet Dispute: At an Albanian-Chinese friendship rally in Peiping on 4 October, China and Albania unequivocally affirmed their solidarity in the Sino-Soviet dispute over world Communist strategy. The Chinese endorsed the Hoxha regime for its "completely correct," uncompromising struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, and the Albanians, in turn, lauded Peiping's defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism. In attacking Tito as a "traitor to the world proletariat," both underscored their displeasure at Khrushchev's gestures of OK

friendship to Tito at the United Nations. Moscow must view Albania's continued defiance as a threat not only to its campaign to isolate Peiping but also to its authority over the Eastern European satellites. The Soviet leaders can be expected, therefore, to take measures to bring Albania into line as quickly as possible. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Laos: The appointment by Souvanna Phouma of a four-man delegation headed by a left-wing neutralist paves the way for early peace talks with the Communist Pathet Lao. Souvanna meanwhile is becoming increasingly negative on the question of negotiations with General Phoumi's group. Souvanna apparently believes that he now has gained the upper hand and that he may be able to avert a compromise leading to the replacement of his government. [REDACTED]

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South Vietnam: Two incidents in the central mountain areas of South Vietnam on 17 and 20 September point to growing Communist activity in the area previously least affected by this year's stepped-up Communist guerrilla campaign. In one, a village district office was attacked by a band of 60-100 guerrillas, the largest Communist force noted in the area since 1955. Communist infiltration into central South Vietnam from the Laos border may increase with further deterioration of the Laos situation, complicating further the serious internal problems faced by the Diem government. [REDACTED]

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I. THE WEST

Cuba: Fidel Castro's experience at the United Nations has apparently strengthened his view of himself as a leader of the peoples of all the underdeveloped countries in their "struggle against imperialism." He evidently plans to return to the UN. Upon his 20 September departure from New York he said he would return in a few weeks; New York hotel officials reported on 3 October that Cuba is seeking reservations beginning 23 October for a delegation that may be headed either by Fidel or Raul Castro. [REDACTED] (Page 6)

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[European Confederation: Common Market officials are highly suspicious of Britain's current efforts to promote some kind of association agreement among the Common Market, the Outer Seven, and the Commonwealth by taking advantage of De Gaulle's proposals for a European confederation. They are convinced that the De Gaulle plan can eventually be "channeled" to serve at least in part the Common Market's objectives, but apparently regard the British pressures as a real threat. According to the deputy chief of the American Mission to the Common Market, his British colleague has led him to believe that London continues to "seek in every way to retard if not prevent any real economic or political integration on the Continent."

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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

BERLIN: The bloc campaign of undermining the Western position in Berlin continues. There are indications that among the next East German steps there may be air harassments.

- C. Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/ Communist hostile action:

LAOS: Communist elements in Laos have continued to enhance their position with military successes in Sam Neua and with the decline of anti-Communist influence over the government resulting from the defeat of General Phoumi's forces

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[REDACTED] and his increasing discouragement. The Pathet Lao are able to exercise increasing influence on the Lao Government and thereby seriously to threaten the political orientation of the country. [REDACTED]

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China and Albania Reaffirm Solidarity of Ideological Views

Tirana and Peiping have seized the occasion of the Chinese Communist 11th anniversary celebrations in Peiping to exchange unequivocal affirmations of solidarity in the current Sino-Soviet dispute. The love feast climaxes a year punctuated by Albanian expressions of sympathy for Chinese policies despite Soviet displeasure and pressure.

The leader of the Albanian delegation to the Chinese celebrations, Deputy Premier Abdyl Kellezi, said at a 4 October rally that the Chinese, under the "wise and flexible" leadership of Mao Tse-tung, have always followed correct political, ideological, and economic policies. He added that China was defending the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and that the friendship between the two countries had been personally endorsed by Albanian party leader Enver Hoxha and Mao. Kellezi's statements were preceded by a warm endorsement of Chinese Communist policies by Hoxha in a 30 September speech in Tirana.

Chiang Nan-hsiang, chairman of the China-Albania Friendship Society, in turn labeled the line of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) party "completely correct," and asserted that "neither towering mountains nor deep oceans" could separate the Chinese and the Albanians. The Chinese even went out of their way on 2 October in Peiping to demonstrate their pleasure with the Albanians by sending a higher ranking delegation to the China-Albania Friendship banquet than they sent to the Soviet ambassador's reception.

Chinese and Albanian statements describing Tito as a "running dog of imperialism" appear to have been for the purpose of showing displeasure over Khrushchev's gestures of friendship toward Tito at the UN General Assembly.

The Chinese apparently are willing to provide more than mere propaganda support to Albania. Chinese business representatives in Hong Kong are reliably reported to have been

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seeking to purchase unspecified amounts of wheat for shipment to Albania in 5,000-ton lots beginning in October. Albania is believed currently to be short of wheat, and this commodity is not in the Albanian-Chinese exchange list this year.

Moscow must view Albania's continued willingness to defy Moscow as a threat not only to its campaign to isolate Peiping but to its authority over the East European satellites. All efforts to bring the Albanians into line--including the use of official snubs and possibly some direct effort to bring about internal political change--have evidently failed. Moscow can be expected to undertake further and more direct measures, in an effort to bring Albania in line before the November meeting in Moscow of world Communist leaders.

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The Situation in Laos

Radio Vientiane announced on 5 October that the Souvanna Phouma government had appointed a four-man delegation for the impending peace talks with the Communist Pathet Lao. Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna's extreme leftist minister of information, will head the delegation, and armed forces commander General Ouane will be a member. The Pathet Lao had previously appointed a three-man delegation, all of whom are members of the movement's Communist inner core.

25X1 [Premier Souvanna told Ambassador Brown on 5 October that he was worried about the increased strength of the Pathet Lao and considered it imperative to start negotiations before the Pathet Lao became even stronger. Souvanna added that he planned to go to Luang Prabang on 6 October to plead with the King to order General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum of the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee to join in support of his government.]

25X1 [Souvanna's emphasis on Phoumi's rallying to his government, rather than on negotiations for a compromise with Savannakhet, reflects his confidence that he has gained the upper hand in his struggle with Phoumi. He apparently now feels that his position is strong enough to avert the political negotiations the King has been promoting for the purpose of forming a new government of national unity under some other premier. He

25X1 [] ordered his associates in Luang Prabang to organize a popular demonstration in his favor timed to coincide with his visit to the royal capital. Such a move would be well calculated to dissuade the King from asking for Souvanna's resignation.]

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Communists Step Up Guerrilla Attacks in Central Region of South Vietnam

Two incidents in late September point to growing Communist guerrilla action in the central mountain provinces of South Vietnam, the area hitherto least affected by the intensified Communist campaign of terrorism and subversion which began early this year. Civil Guard troops in one coastal province inflicted several casualties and captured rifles and sub-machine guns after encircling a Communist hide-out on 17 September. On 20 September, a district office in Quang Nam Province, about 100 miles south of the truce line, was attacked and ransacked by a band of 60-100 guerrillas, the largest Communist force noted in the area since 1955.

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[] In a discussion of the latter incident, South Vietnamese President Diem told American Embassy officials that a Communist commander killed in the clash carried instructions from Hanoi to blow up certain bridges throughout the region. Diem's brother and political adviser in the region, Ngo Dinh Can, also recently stated that the September attacks indicated a departure in his area from past Communist tactics of propaganda and sporadic terrorism. [This region, traditionally called Central Vietnam, was formerly a Communist stronghold, but has been generally quiescent since the departure of Viet Minh troops after the 1954 truce divided the country into North and South Vietnam. It is vulnerable to further Communist infiltration across its common borders with North Vietnam as well as from Laos, should the situation there further deteriorate.

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[] Vietnamese Army units are stationed near the border with North Vietnam, but have been employed against the Communist guerrillas principally in the delta provinces southwest of Saigon, where the subversive campaign has been most intense. The American army attaché has reported that on 28 September, following an attack by a large Communist band 20 miles west of Saigon, the army retaliated with its most effective example to date of a combined operation, using ground and air forces.]

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Castro Evidently Planning Return to UN General Assembly

Fidel Castro's experience at the United Nations late last month has apparently strengthened his view of himself as a leader of the people, not only of Latin America, but of all underdeveloped countries in their "struggle against imperialism." Upon his departure from New York on 28 September he said he would return in a few weeks; a New York hotel manager says he has refused a Cuban request for reservations beginning 23 October because he has good information that the party would include Raul or Fidel Castro.

Castro's UN address on 26 September evidently struck a responsive chord among the delegations of some of the new African states, and the Cuban-proposed agenda item on land reform will provide another occasion for Cuba to pose as the champion of the underdeveloped nations. Castro told a Cuban television audience on 30 September that "we are thinking of presenting a motion in the United Nations against racial segregation in the United States." In a further effort to identify his regime with world neutralist leaders, Castro declared on his return to Cuba that Nkrumah may visit Cuba late this year and Nasir next March.

The Castro regime, which is giving increasing propaganda support to the cause of the Algerian rebels, is apparently to act as host later this month for a conference sponsored by the "Algerian Aid Committee" based in Morocco. The committee member representing the Communists' World Federation of Trade Unions had urged Havana as the site of the conference.

Cuba's withdrawal on 4 October of its candidacy for a UN Security Council seat, which it had little hope of winning, may have been in return for a promise by some Latin American delegations for support for a council seat next year.

Meanwhile, the Catholic archbishop of Santiago, in Oriente Province, issued a pastoral letter on 2 October constituting the

strongest anti-Communist statement yet made by any church official in Cuba. Although the church is weak in Cuba generally, its prestige in Oriente is greater than elsewhere on the island because of the firm anti-Batista stand taken by many churchmen in that province during Castro's war against the Batista dictatorship. The archbishop himself is credited with saving Castro's life in 1959 after he had been captured by the Batista forces. [REDACTED]

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Common Market Officials Fear British Exploitation of
European Confederation Plan

The De Gaulle proposals for a confederation of the six European Common Market countries are evidently regarded by Common Market officials as a lesser threat to the future development of the European Economic Community than the possibility of British exploitation of it. According to the deputy chief of the American Mission to the Common Market, recent talks with Community officials have revealed a "dedicated conviction" that the De Gaulle plan "will eventually be channeled" to serve at least in part the Common Market's objectives. This optimism is tempered, however, by realization of the extent to which London is using the opportunity provided by the De Gaulle plan to renew pressure for some kind of association agreement among the Common Market, the British-led Outer Seven, and the Commonwealth.

London is exerting its pressure for such an agreement primarily on Bonn. Common Market officials believe that thus far the West German Foreign Ministry is resisting these pressures and has not yet produced any new plan for linking the Community with Britain and the Commonwealth. They are not sure, however, how firm this resistance is, and believe that Adenauer--ordinarily a strong supporter of the Common Market--is increasingly influenced by German industry, which has long wanted an economic association broader than the Community. If London and Bonn can work out such a plan, it will then be cleared with the respective members of the Common Market and the Outer Seven and presented as a fait accompli to the United States, which is opposed to any preferential arrangement between the two groupings.

The initial reaction to the De Gaulle proposals has probably encouraged London to pursue its efforts to reach an accommodation with the Common Market. Many within the Common Market have pointed out that, by proposing to put curbs on the supranational development of the Community, De Gaulle

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[redacted] was removing one of London's major objections to it. Moreover, immediately after his July visit to De Gaulle when the confederation proposal was first advanced, Adenauer--apparently somewhat piqued with De Gaulle and with the Common Market--proposed to Macmillan a new survey of the accommodation problem.

This may have encouraged London to expect agreement on more favorable terms than it is likely to get. The deputy chief of the American Mission to the Common Market believes his British colleague has recently made it "abundantly clear that Britain continues to seek in every way to retard if not prevent any real economic or political integration on the Continent" and has been told by him that "British policy on the Six-Seven issue has not changed in the slightest." [redacted]

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

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